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Pacific Asia has been one of the most dynamic cases of outward-oriented de- 
velopment in the world in the past two decades. In light of the emerging trend 
toward “institutional” regional integration, as in Europe 1992 and NAFTA, it 
has been widely discussed whether Pacific Asia’s development has enhanced 
regional  economic  interdependence  or  “natural”  integration  through  trade 
flows (see, e.g., Eaton and Ho  1993; Frankel  1992; Frankel and Wei  1994; 
Petri 1993; Saxonhouse 1993). 
It would be natural, then, to ask whether we can also find regional integra- 
tion through capital, as through trade. Before discussing  integration issues, 
however, we should realize what is going on in both inter- and intraregional 
capital flows in Pacific Asia. Nevertheless, there are fewer studies of  capital 
flows than of trade (e.g., Yuan  1986; Frankel 1992; Kohsaka 1993). Thus we 
must first examine the changing patterns of  capital flows and the degree of 
interdependence through capital in the region. 
There is a vast literature on the general trend in capital flows to developing 
countries, provided by  multilateral financial institutions (such as the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund [IMF] 1994; the World Bank  1993c; Bank for Interna- 
tional Settlements [BIS] 1994; International Finance Corporation 1992). Based 
on these studies, this paper will review the changing pattern  and nature of 
capital flows in Pacific Asia since the 1980s, to identify underlying fundamen- 
tal factors that not only have contributed to these changes but also are unique 
to the region. We will then clarify intraregional interdependence through capi- 
tal, and the role of Japan in it, by  investigating multilateral aspects of these 
flows within the region. 
Akira Kohsaka is professor of economics at the Osaka School of  International Public Policy, 
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Capital flows consist of such components as grants, official loans, suppliers 
and export credits, commercial bank loans, foreign direct investment, and port- 
folio investment. Significant changes in the pattern of external finance to devel- 
oping countries during the last two decades can be found in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 shows that “the 1970s and 1980s were the boom-and-bust years of 
commercial  bank  finance to developing  countries”  (World Bank  1993b). In 
1981 more than seven times as much long-term capital rushed into developing 
countries as a decade earlier, while the flow increased by  less than 30 percent 
over the next decade. Accompanying shifts in the composition of  flows were 
dominated by changes in the role of commercial bank loans. In  198  1, commer- 
cial bank loans made up the largest share of total external finance to developing 
countries, followed by official loans and then by foreign direct investment; in 
1991 commercial bank loans had fallen to second largest, far behind official 
loans and closely followed by foreign direct investment. 
As  will  be  shown  below,  external  finance  to  Pacific  Asia-comprising 
China,  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Korea  (South),  Malaysia,  the  Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand-has  also followed this trend, but to a lim- 
ited degree. In addition, the region will be shown to have intensified  natural 
integration through intraregional capital flows, as it had through trade flows in 
the late 1980s. 
Previous studies found the following changing pattern of capital flows in the 
region up to the early 1980s: First, capital flows from developed economies in 
the Pacific Basin increased in importance. Second, the importance of Japan in 
particular was magnified across all components of capital flows. Third, private 
flows played a more significant role than official flows. The 1980s saw quite 
dynamic changes in the region, however, so it is not difficult to imagine that 
this pattern no longer holds. 
Furthermore, the early 1990s is said to have seen a radical shift in the pattern 
of  capital flows to developing countries “from debt to equity financing and 
Table 4.1  External Finance to Developing Countries: Gross Long-Term Flows 
(% of total) 




Suppliers and export 
credits 
Commercial bank loans 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio investment 
Total (billion $) 
39.9  33.3  45.3 
9.0  7.3  14.5 
30.9  26.0  30.8 
10.8  11.0  12.3 
35.7  46.  I  17.4 
12.3  8.3  16.5 
1.2  I .3  8.5 
19.5  156.9  205.3 
Source: World Bank (1993b) 109  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
from bank to nonbank sources” (World Bank 1993b). This shift partly reflects 
the improved  economic climate in  some Latin American countries. Can we 
find similar development in Pacific Asia? 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 4.1 demonstrates differences in 
patterns of external finance between Asia and Latin America in order to show 
regional diversity of recent developments in capital flows. Recent changes in 
the structure of foreign capital inflow and local capital outflow, rather than of 
net flows, are examined in section 4.2 for both Pacific Asia as a whole and 
individual countries in the region. Since Pacific Asian countries have diverse 
structures of external finance, we suggest that regional aggregation  may ob- 
scure or distort the size and direction of capital flows. Section 4.3 attempts to 
identify underlying factors that not only have helped realize these changes but 
also are unique to the region. We suggest that changes in macroeconomic bal- 
ances  provide  the  fundamental  mechanism  that  has  determined  structural 
changes in net capital flows. In Section 4.4, we scrutinize changes in the geo- 
graphical distribution of these capital flows and indicate that the changes sug- 
gest increasing regional interdependence through capital flows, resulting in a 
sophisticated network of multilateral flows in the region, which would magnify 
the “regional aggregation bias” mentioned above. Then, section 4.5 examines 
the role of Japan as one of the key players in the region with respect to capital 
flows and finds some important changes there. Some conclusive remarks will 
be made at the end of the paper. 
4.1  Regional Patterns of External Finance 
Recent trends in capital flows to developing countries contrast sharply with 
those of the mid-1980s with respect to not only amount but composition. An- 
nual average net flows declined from $31 billion for the years  1977-82  to $9 
billion for 1983-89  and then rebounded to $92 billion for 1990-93  (see table 
4.2 below for the developing countries’ total net flow). Among the components 
of  capital flows, the dominant one has been foreign direct investment (FDI), 
with portfolio investment showing remarkable growth, while long-term loans 
were actually flowing out. 
The amount of foreign capital inflow net of amortization is sometimes called 
“net resource flows.”  *  Figure 4.1 shows the amount and composition of long- 
term net resource flows to all developing countries, to East Asia and the Pacific, 
and to Latin America and the Caribbean during the period  1982-94  (World 
Bank  1994).2 It is obvious that the  above-mentioned general trend in gross 
1. Net resource flows here consist of the net flow of long-term debt excluding IMF credits, direct 
foreign investment (net), and grants (excluding technical cooperation). Net resource flows minus 
grants correspond to changes in liabilities in the long-term capital account of the balance of  pay- 
ments. 
2. In addition to Pacific Asia, East Asia and the Pacific includes Fiji, Laos, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. A 
(cio.reii1 pi'icrs, 1JSS billion) 
260 
1 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994 
B 
(currenl pi-ices, US$  billion) 
100 










1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994 C 
(currefir  /JI ices, US$  hilliorr) 
70  I 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994 
W Grants  OOfficial loans  Foreign direct investment  Private loans  E  Portfolio equity flows 
Fig. 4.1 
Caribbean 
Source: World Bank (1995). 
Net resource flows by region: (A)  all developing countries; (B)  East Asia and the Pacific; (C) Latin America and the 112  Akira Kohsaka 
capital flows to developing countries as a whole is not necessarily identical to 
those of individual regions. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean (fig. 4.1C), total net flows sharply de- 
clined from a peak of $50 billion in  1981, remained  low at around $10-$20 
billion during 1983-88, and then rebounded to eventually surpass the previous 
peak in  1993. During this process, the composition  of capital flows changed 
dramatically. The flow of private loans (mostly commercial bank loans) disap- 
peared and then turned negative (i.e., flowed out) in the mid- 1980s. In its place, 
FDI became the most important form of capital flow, and in  1993, portfolio 
equity flows became the next most important form; private loans came back, 
not as bank loans, but as bond issues. 
In contrast, East Asia and the Pacific never saw as significant a decline in 
net capital flows as Latin America, even in the early 1980s (fig. 4.18). Total 
net flows remained stable during 1980-85  at around $15-$20 billion. The ma- 
jor form of  capital was commercial  bank  loans, and the second was official 
loans. There then appeared a vigorous  surge in total net capital flows, espe- 
cially after  1986; this time, FDI was far more  significant than  in the early 
198Os, while commercial bank loans resumed its growth as a major compo- 
nent, and portfolio equity flows surged starting in the early 1990s. Now, if we 
turn to the capital account figures of the balance of payments (see table 4.2), 
we can ascertain more striking contrasts between these two regions. 
In the Western Hemisphere, foreign capital ourfow in Other long-term flows 
(mainly  commercial  bank  loans)  continued not  only  in  1983-89  under  the 
“debt overhang” but even in 1990-93,  the most recent period listed. Note that 
this outflow forced the region to be a net capital exporter, instead of an im- 
porter, in the 1980s, which has been called the “lost decade.” Under these cir- 
cumstances, the surge of foreign capital inflow in the  1990s took, primarily, 
the form of  portfolio investment (i.e. bonds and equities) and, then, the form 
of FDI. 
On the other hand, Asia continued to receive a significant amount of foreign 
loans, although FDI caught up to and then exceeded this amount, and portfolio 
investment was catching up toward  the  1990~.~  More important, one notable 
fact is that local capital outflow (the assets flows in table 4.2) in Asia has be- 
come significant in each component of capital transactions, namely, FDI, port- 
folio investment, and loans. In fact, these annual average outflows amounted 
to about one-third of  the corresponding foreign capital inflows for the period 
1990-93.  This will be shown to reflect increasing capital interdependence in 
Pacific Asia. 
3. In addition to Pacific Asia, “Asia” includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Kiribati, 
Laos, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua  New  Guinea,  Solomon Islands, Sri  Lanka, 
Tonga, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, and “‘Asia  not specified.” Table 4.2  Capital Account: Asia and Western Hemisphere (annual averages) 
Amount (billion US.  $)  Share (%) 
Net Flow  1973-76  1977-82  1983-89  1990-93  1973-76  1977-82  1983-89  1990-93 
Developing 
countries total 
FDI  3.7 
Assets  -0.3 
Liabilities  4 
Portfolio  -5.6 
Assets  -6.4 
Liabilities  0.8 
Other LT  17.2 
Liabilities  19.1 
LT  total  15.3 
Assets  -8.6 
Liabilities  23.9 
ST Capital  -0.5 
Assets  -8.6 
Liabilities  8.1 
Total net  14.8 
Assets  -17.2 
Liabilities  32 
Assets  -1.9 
Asia 
FDI  1.3 
Assets  -0.  I 
Liabilities  1.4 
Portfolio  0.2 
Assets  0 
Liabilities  0.2 
Other LT  4.1 
Assets  -0.1 
Liabilities  4.2 
LT  total  5.6 
Assets  -0.2 
Liabilities  5.8 
ST Capital  1.2 
Assets  -0.8 
Liabilities  2 
Total  6.8 
Assets  -I 
Liabilities  7.8 
Western 
Hemisphere 
FDI  2.2 
Assets  -0.1 
Liabilities  2.3 
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Table 4.2  (continued) 
Amount (billion US.  $)  Share (%) 















-0.1  -0.2 
0.3  1.8 
9.1  22.2 
9.7  23.2 
11.5  29.1 
-0.8  -  1.4 
12.3  30.5 
1.5  -2.8 
-2.8  -8.8 
4.3  6 
13  26.3 
-3.6  -10.2 
16.6  36.5 




-  14.3 
-  10.8 
-0.4 




-  16.6 
0.6 
-  17.2 





























14.3  100.0 
5.9  7.7 
76.3  129.6 
71.4  -75.0 
76.1  137.5 
110.6  65.1 
13.7  -66.7 
83.6  60.5 
-10.6  34.9 
86.3  166.7 
16.4  39.5 
100.0  100.0 
100.0  100.0 















Source: IMF ( 1994) 
4.2  Capital Flows in Pacific Asia 
4.2.  I  Individual Patterns of Capital Flow 
We have seen some differences in regional patterns of capital flow by com- 
paring Asia with Latin America. Regionally aggregated capital flows, however, 
may  not be very useful in grasping the changing nature and pattern of  these 
flows in individual economies within the region, or rather, may obscure im- 
portant differences between these economies. This is true for the case of Pa- 
cific Asia. Table 4.3 shows capital accounts of the balance of payments in Pa- 
cific Asia  in  aggregate  as well  as for  individual  economies.  Overall, there 
appears to be little difference between Asia in table 4.2 and Pacific Asia in 
table 4.3. However, if we look into individual  economies, table 4.3 suggests 
two points. First, during the period  1986-89,  both  Korea and Malaysia had 
huge net outflows of foreign loans, of which a significant part was premature 
amortization. This was not an involuntary outflow due to the drying-up of new 
loans as in the case of Latin America, but a voluntary outflow due to these 
countries’ remarkably  improved external balances. In this case, it should be 
noted  that regional  aggregation tends  to understate the  significance  of  loan 
capital in the other economies in the region because Korea’s and Malaysia’s 
outflows  offset  other  countries’  “other”  flows  (liabilities)  for  the  period 
Second, the geographical distribution of local capital outflow shows high con- 
centration in the Asian newly industrializing economies (ANIEs). That is, in Pa- 
cific Asia, there seem to have been broadly two types of economies in terms of 
1986-89. Table 4.3  Long-Term Capital Account: Pacific Asia (annual averages) 
Amount (million U.S. $)  Share (%) 
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-  14 
-  I94 
180 
676 
-  1,490 
2,166 
-81 
-  20 
-61 
-5,350 
-  1,592 
-3,759 
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Table 4.3  (continued) 
Amount (million U.S. $)  Share (%) 
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-  1,680 
-  154 
1,920 
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10,121 
2,044 
































100.0  100.0 
100.0  100.0 
100.0  100.0 
171.0  27.9 
71.3  32.2 
30.6  43.8 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-71.0  72.1 
28.7  67.8 
69.4  56.2 
100.0  100.0 
100.0  100.0 
100.0  100.0 
28.6  20.4 
81.7  116.9 
30.0  21.7 
20.5  0.4 
0.0  0.0 
20.0  0.4 
50.9  79.1 
18.3  -  16.9 
50.0  77.9 
Source: IMF (various years [a]). 
capital flows since the latter half of the 1980s: one type with not insignificant 
two-way flows and the other type with mostly foreign capital inflow. Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan (and, probably, Hong Kong, for which balance of pay- 
ments data are not available) are the former, and Indonesia and the Philippines 
are the latter; Malaysia and Thailand appear to be joining the former group. 
For individual countries in Pacific Asia, the local and foreign flows in the 
main components of  capital since the  1980s can be summarized as follows 
(see table 4.3). In three ANIEs, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, either current 
accounts have tended to run a surplus or local outflow has exceeded foreign 
inflow at least in some components of capital. Taiwan has been an extreme case 
in that, since the latter half of the 1980s, local capital outflow has overwhelmed 
foreign capital inflow in direct investment, portfolio investment, and other 
long-term capital. Singapore has become a net overseas portfolio investor since 
the late 1980s while remaining a net host country in terms of direct investment. 118  Akira Kohsaka 
Korea has become a net overseas  direct investor  since the late  1980s while 
having been an important portfolio “investee” since the early 1990s. 
In complete contrast to Taiwan, Indonesia and the Philippines have both re- 
mained one-way capital absorbers. Between these two groups, Malaysia, Thai- 
land, and China have begun to send capital abroad as either direct investment 
(in the cases of Thailand and China) or portfolio investment (in the cases of 
Malaysia and China), while all three countries have been important destina- 
tions for the recent explosion of FDI from Japan and the Asian NIEs. 
4.2.2  Individual Patterns of Foreign Capital Inflow 
The most recent developments in foreign capital inflow are shown in table 
4.4. The steadily increasing share of FDI in foreign capital inflow has been the 
most salient feature. In China, Malaysia, and Singapore,  FDI has been the most 
important component of  capital  inflow. FDI literally rushed into China; the 
average share of FDI in  total net long-term  flows exceeded 50 percent  over 
The growing prominence of FDI reflects  increased intraregional trade and 
intraregional division of labor under the global production, sourcing, and mar- 
keting strategies pursued by international businesses, as well as local market 
growth and deregulation. Indeed, we note that there is not only geographical 
concentration  of  FDI but also shifts in FDI even within  Pacific Asia, which 
seems to result at least somewhat from “regulatory arbitrage” on the part of 
international businesses. 
Meanwhile,  in  Korea,  Malaysia,  and  Thailand,  portfolio  investment  has 
grown rapidly very recently. In particular, in Korea more than 80 percent of 
net resource inflow in 1990-93 was portfolio investment. 
Foreign investment in bonds includes both international issues, such as Eu- 
rodollar bonds, and direct purchases of local securities, which virtually started 
to expand in  1993 in Pacific Asia (see OECD, various issues); Hong Kong, 
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand have been main recipients. Portfolio equity in- 
vestment, on the other hand, includes international issues (including depository 
receipts) and direct purchases in local markets; China, Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand are the main recipients. 
Finally, “official debt,” or official loans, remained  significant, though rela- 
tively smaller, in China, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Its role was reduced 
sharply in Malaysia and Thailand, however. This will be discussed in section 
4.4 in more detail. 
1990-93. 
4.3  Macroeconomic Development in Pacific Asia 
4.3.1  Factors in the Recent Developments in Capital Flows 
We have observed that significant changes have occurred in capital flows to 
developing countries in general, as well as to Pacific Asia. What drove these Table 4.4  Capital Inflow: Pacific Asia (annual averages) 
Flow 
Amount (million U.S.  $)  Share (%) 
1986-89  1990-93  1986-89  1990-93 
China 
Net resource flow 







ST debt flow 
Net total flow 
Indonesia 
Net resource flow 







ST debt flow 
Net total flow 
Korea 
Net resource flow 







ST debt flow 
Net total flow 
Malaysia 
Net resource flow 







ST debt flow 























-  907 
-  I6 
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-  205 
-  74 
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Table 4.4  (continued) 
Flow 
Amount (million US.  $) 
1986-89  1990-93  1986-89  1990-93 
Sharc (9%) 
Philippines 
Net resource flow 







ST debt flow 
Net total flow 
Thailand 
Net resource flow 







ST debt flow 




-  149 












































































Source: World Bank (1994). 
developments? Both domestic and international influences must have been at 
work (see, e.g., Fernandez-Arias 1994; Ghosh and Ostry 1993; Gooptu 1994). 
The increasing share of FDI in both foreign capital inflow and local capital 
outflow has been the most salient feature of Pacific Asia. Consensus, however, 
has not yet been achieved on what exactly determines FDI. Such factors as 
low labor cost and product life cycle have become relatively less important 
because of technological changes. Taxation and other policy measures in the 
home country of  multinational firms have become more crucial in determin- 
ing FDI. 
Nevertheless, changes in the international economic environment do play a 
crucial role in determining the size and direction of FDI. Remember that the 
FDI boom of the 1980s, mentioned above, was triggered by the major currency 
realignment due to the Plaza Accord in 1985, which brought drastic changes 
in international competitiveness among manufacturing exporters. The growing 
protectionist  atmosphere in developed countries is another factor that could 
explain the relocation of production sites from developed to developing coun- 
tries. 
In contrast to FDI, portfolio investment requires a rather well arranged do- 121  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
mestic  capital market,  which rarely exists in developing countries. Further- 
more,  although portfolio investment  to some developing economies has ex- 
panded  sharply  in  recent  years,  it  may  reflect  only  temporary  favorable 
international  economic  conditions. Accordingly,  it is not  yet  clear  whether 
portfolio investment could be a sustainable source of external finance to devel- 
oping countries. 
International  influences consist of  both cyclical and  structural factors. As 
with an upsurge in banking capital inflow to developing countries in the latter 
half of the  1970s, a cyclical downturn in industrial countries and a resulting 
decline in their interest rates played a significant role in the surge of portfolio 
investment in “emerging markets” in the early  1990s-as  well as its recent 
reversal due to higher interest rates. Structural factors include institutional and 
technological developments in investor countries, which have enhanced com- 
petition in capital markets, increased capital mobility by lowering the transac- 
tion costs of market access, and widened the range of both investors and finan- 
cial instruments. It has recently been observed that there has been increased 
international diversification of portfolio investment along with an broadened 
investor base.4 
For host  countries, the basic  determinants  of  foreign  investment  include 
sound macroeconomic management, a well-qualified  labor force, an efficient 
private sector, and an adequate regulatory system and policy framework. These 
factors are not necessarily sufficient but are crucial preconditions for attracting 
foreign capital that are well within the control of developing countries. 
Now,  supposing  that  developing  economies  share  international  develop- 
ments in common,  we will focus on domestic developments in Pacific Asia, 
which  has attained  remarkable  results as distinct from other regions. More 
specifically, remembering that one of the key roles of capital flows is as invest- 
ment finance, we will concentrate on the macroeconomic development of the 
Pacific Asian  countries. As for regulatory  and policy  frameworks, all these 
countries significantly opened up their capital accounts during the mid- 1980~ 
though it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the changing regulatory 
systems and policy  frameworks for foreign capital flows and to assess their 
impact.’ 
4. In the 1990s we have seen a wider range of financial assets and a greater weight of institu- 
tional investors. These are both a cause and a result of increased global capital market integration. 
Technological advances and financial deregulation in developed countries, as well as financial 
asset accumulation, also constitute fundamental factors explaining these developments. 
5. We give a cursory review of policy changes toward capital flows: Taiwan has been relatively 
generous to foreign capital in the manufacturing sector, but restrictive on overseas investment. In 
the 1980s,  Taiwan worried about a persistent external surplus and eroded international competi- 
tiveness in export sectors, so it opened sectors further and allowed overseas portfolio and direct 
investment in the 1980s. FDI in Taiwan and Taiwanese overseas investment have both shown re- 
markable growth since 1987. 
In  contrast to Taiwan, Korea  restricted incoming FDI in the  1970s and, instead, introduced 
commercial loans and allocated them at government discretion. But, once a medium-term external 
surplus  was achieved in the mid-l980s, Korea seriously began trying to open capital transactions 122  Akira Kohsaka 
4.3.2  Structural Changes in Macroeconomic Balances 
Macroeconomic  stability has often been regarded as one of the conditions 
necessary  to attract foreign capital by demonstrating  the manageability and 
creditworthiness of host countries. In this context, table 4.5 compares several 
macroeconomic  indicators for “high-inflow’’ countries  in Asia  and in Latin 
America-those  countries that attracted relatively high foreign capital inflow 
during 1990-93. 
One of the interesting findings from table 4.5 is that there appears to be no 
association  between macroeconomic  stability and net capital inflow. By any 
measure of  macroeconomic  performance-real  economic growth, domestic 
inflation,  current account imbalance, or external debt indicators-the  high- 
inflow economies in Asia were superior to those in Latin America. Openness 
as measured by  the ratio of exports to GDP was also higher in Asia than in 
Latin America, and became more so, which naturally led to lower debt service 
ratios in Asia  than  in  Latin America.  In fact, high-inflow  countries in Asia 
attracted foreign capital inflow through the three most recent periods, while 
those in Latin America all but lost access to the international capital market 
during 1983-89. 
Of  course,  we  could  say  that  the  macroeconomic  performance  during 
1977-82  was the cause of the “debt crisis” and that during  1983-89  was the 
result, so that these periods could be regarded as a learning process for both 
international investors and host countries over their reckless behaviors in the 
past.  But  how  then  can we  reconcile  this  with  developments in  the  recent 
period? 
More striking differences between the two country groups can be found in 
such structural measures as ratios of private  investment and consumption to 
GDP. First, the average investment ratio in the Asian group was significantly 
higher than in the Latin American group, and became more so over the years. 
In fact, the ratio for 1990-93  was more than  1.5 times higher in Asia than in 
Latin America. Second, in Asia the investment ratio increased and the con- 
sumption ratio decreased through the three most recent periods, while in Latin 
America the consumption ratio showed significantly larger increases than the 
investment ratio from 1973-76  to 1977-82  and again from 1983-89  to 1990- 
93. In other words, we can see that, as is often observed, positive net foreign 
capital inflow was used for investment  finance in Asia and for consumption 
finance in Latin America. Put differently, capital inflow augmented  domestic 
both inward and outward in a gradual manner. Increasing overseas direct investment and portfolio 
investment in the domestic market reflect the accelerated pace of this recent development. 
The ASEAN4 nations-Indonesia,  Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand-made  efforts in 
the early 1980s to attract export-oriented foreign manufacturing corporations; these efforts were 
fully realized in the late 1980s. Recently, however, the rapid increase in FDI has led to bottlenecks 
of  infrastructure so that, for example, preferential policies for FDI  were partly “retrenched” in 
Malaysia in 1991. 123  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
Table 4.5  Macroeconomic Indicators: High-Inflow (1990-93) Asia and Western 
Hemisphere (annual averages; % of GDP unless otherwise noted) 
Indicators  1973-76  1977-82  1983-89  1990-93 
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Source: IMF (1994). 
Note: To  define high- and low-inflow groups, countries within each region were ranked on the 
basis of average net capital inflow during 1990-93.  Small countries with purchasing-power-parity 
(PPP) shares less than 0.1 percent in each region were excluded. 
'Annual  percentage change. Entry for 1973-76  reflects 1974-76. 
bData available only from 1979 onward. Entry for 1977-82 reflects 1980-82. 
savings to finance investment in Asia, while it substituted  for them in Latin 
America. 
If we look at individual countries in Pacific Asia, we can find more dramatic 
structural changes in macroeconomic balances from the 1980s onward. Devel- 
oping economies are generally thought of as being short of domestic savings 
and, as a result, likely to run a persistent external deficit. This is no longer the 
case in Pacific Asia. Table 4.6 shows domestic investment, national  savings, 
the ratio of the saving-investment gap to GDP, and real economic growth in 
Pacific Asia since 1978. 
In the ANIEs-Hong  Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan-savings  ratios Table 4.6  Macroeconomic Balances: Pacific Asia (% of GDP and 


































































































































































































Sources: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1994); Key Indica- 
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have shown a steady upward trend  in the last two decades and remained or 
become high enough that saving-investment differences have been positive or 
close to positive since the mid-1980s. Now, capital flows in the NIEs can in- 
crease on both the asset and liability sides, which makes the picture of capital 
flows in the region more complex than before; this situation will be discussed 
in section 4.4. 
Unless the NIEs accumulate official foreign reserves indefinitely, their posi- 
tive saving-investment differences imply negative net capital inflows or posi- 
tive outflows, which may or may not be directed toward Pacific Asia. Of course, 
this does not mean that the ANIEs have become immune to external deficits. 
The point here is that some economies in the region have already "graduated" 
from the savings-shortage situation that is typical of developing economies so 
that financing the saving-investment  gap is no longer their first priority  for 
capital flows. 
While this is not yet the case in the other economies in the region, savings 
ratios in Indonesia, Thailand, and China have also been relatively high andor 
showing steady upward trends (the Philippines has been under economic stress 
since the debt crisis). Indeed, we should note that domestic savings have played 
a far more important role in investment finance than foreign savings and will 
do so in the future. These high and growing domestic savings reflect macroeco- 
nomic discipline and could support self-sustained growth through internal in- 
vestment finance.6 This growth would help maintain foreign capital inflow to 
augment domestic  savings,  even  when  these  countries  suffer from cyclical 
downturns. Here we see the major difference between Latin America and Pa- 
cific Asia. As far as domestic factors are concerned, the sustainability of exter- 
nal finance depends not only on short-term macroeconomic stability but also 
on longer-term macroeconomic-balance structures. 
4.4  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
From the analysis in section 4.3, we learned that both the financing needs 
of saving-investment gaps and the components of capital flows have changed 
and diversified over time and across economies in Pacific Asia since the 1980s. 
Until now, however, our observations have been limited to bilateral aspects of 
capital flows in countries andor  regions. Here we will try to extend our discus- 
sion to a multilateral  network of  capital flows in the region. We will discuss 
official capital flows, direct investment, and bank loans, in turn. 
4.4.1  Official Capital Flows 
Net official flows had been or turned negative in several rapidly  growing 
economies (the ANIEs, Malaysia, and Thailand) in the late  1980s, while the 
other economies (China, Indonesia, and the Philippines) are still more or less 
6. Causality appears to go from income growth to savings ratio (see World Bank 199%) 126  Akira Kohsaka 
dependent on official flows as a major financial source (table 4.4). But, note 
that these official flows did not change evenly across their components. 
Official capital flows are divided into two components-official  develop- 
ment  assistance (ODA) and  other official  flows (0OF)-according  to their 
“grant elements.” OOF is likely to be “retrenched” faster than ODA in rapidly 
growing economies because it is rational to obtain and hold less costly loans 
and to repay more costly ones first. Table 4.7 shows net official flows of Pacific 
Asian economies by component and by creditor in dollar terms and in percent- 
age shares. 
Table 4.7 shows that Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand seemed to enter the net 
repayment  “phase”  of relatively  costly OOF in the latter half  of  the  1980s. 
However, Malaysia and Thailand still depend on less costly ODA to a signifi- 
cant degree, while Korea has “graduated”  and ceased to depend on official 
financial resources. 
The relative contributions of some major creditors are also found in table 
4.7. Regarding ODA, Japan’s role remains dominant (with a greater than 50 
percent share) and is still increasing in Malaysia. But this is no longer the case 
with respect to OOF. The role of the United States in ODA was modest and has 
diminished (with a less than 5 percent share). Multilateral institutions as a whole 
have been more important than the United States, but far less so than Japan. 
On the other hand, table 4.7 gives a different picture  of  official flows to 
Indonesia,  the  Philippines,  and  China. All  three  have been  receiving  still- 
increasing amounts of ODA as well as OOE For Indonesia and the Philippines, 
Japan’s contribution was significant (with a greater than 50 percent share of 
ODA) and even expanded. For the Philippines, the United States has been a 
more important official creditor than multilateral  institutions as a whole. For 
China, though, in both  ODA and OOF, Japan’s  share is declining relative to 
that of multilateral institutions. 
In keeping with the recent global trend, the importance of official flows as 
a source of  external finance has somewhat declined in Pacific Asia. But this 
should be attributed to the “graduation” of several high-growth members in 
the region, rather than to the geographical redistribution of  official develop- 
ment finance after the end of the Cold War as is generally claimed (e.g., see 
World Bank 1993b). 
As for official capital flows, Japan has played a key role in enhancing re- 
gional interdependence in capital flows, but its role has changed significantly 
with the dynamic growth in the region. Japan’s contribution to both ODA and 
OOF to the ANIEs has become modest, and this is also the case at least for 
OOF to the higher-income ASEAN4. But, for the rest of  the region, Japan’s 
role not only has remained significant but has grown.’ 
7. Most recently, ANIEs and some ASEAN members began to provide official financial assis- 
tance to neighboring low-income countries. We  are going to observe two-way flows not only in 
FDI but in official flows in this region. Table 4.7  Net Official Flows: Pacific Asia (annual averages) 
Amount (million U.S. $)  Share (%) 
United  Multi-  United  Multi- 
Net Flow  Japan  States  national  Total  Japan  States  national  Total 
China 
ODA 
1981-85  304.8 
1986-90  655.8 
1990-92  786.4 
OOF 
1981-85  60.2 
1986-90  124.7 
1990-92  105.5 
Indonesia 
ODA 
1981-85  231.8 
1986-90  773.2 
1990-92  1,096.7 
1981-85  13.8 
1986-90  407.4 




1981-85  48.1 
1986-90  19.4 
1990-92  36.1 
1981-85  1.8 
1986-90  -  1.2 




1981-85  120.6 
1986-90  158.2 
1990-92  243.2 
1981-85  10.5 
1990-92  40.3 
OOF 
1986-90  -23.5 
Philippines 
ODA 
1981-85  178.7 
1986-90  480.7 
1990-92  712.4 
1981-85  44.0 
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Table 4.7  (continued) 
Amount (million US.  $)  Share (9%) 
United  Multi-  United  Multi- 
Net Flow  Japan  States  national  Total  Japan  States  national  Total 
1990-92  140.3  116.7  396.0  751.4  18.7  15.5  52.7  100.0 
Thailand 
ODA 
1981-85  225.8  24.6  86.3  436.4  51.7  5.6  19.8  100.0 
1986-90  366.2  27.6  73.3  616.4  59.4  4.5  11.9  100.0 
1990-92  412.9  23.7  19.4  763.8  54.1  3.1  10.4  100.0 
1981-85  22.4  -13.4  364.9  425.8  5.3  -3.1  85.7  100.0 
1986-90  83.8  -9.6  -125.9  -40.7  -205.8  23.6  309.2  100.0 
1990-92  218.8  15.0  -244.0  93.8  233.2  16.0  -260.1  100.0 
OOF 
Source: Geogruphicul Distribution of  Financial Flows to Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, various 
issues). 
4.4.2  Foreign Direct Investment 
There are no reliable comprehensive data available on the geographical dis- 
tribution of private capital flows within Pacific Asia. But, for direct investment, 
we can make a good conjecture about the general tendency of its movement 
by compiling figures on individual host economies for stocks of direct invest- 
ment by investor country as shown in table 4.8. 
Note that each economy’s figures for FDI are not exactly comparable (see 
Japan External Trade Organization  1993). Some are on approval basis, and 
others are on  disbursement basis. Benchmark years for the accumulation of 
investment figures are different across the economies. Some figures are totals 
of  all industries; others cover only manufacturing. And FDI from the ANIEs 
and other developing economies are often unavailable separately, which would 
lead to an underestimation of FDI by the ANIEs and theASEAN4 countries here. 
Despite  these  shortcomings, we  can  safely  obtain  a  general  picture  of 
changes in the amount, pace, and direction of FDI in the region from table 4.8 
as follows: 
First, throughout the period  1982-93,  FDI increased vigorously in the re- 
gion. Total FDI in the region increased by 1.7 times during 1982-86,2.5  times 
during 1986-90,  and 1.9 times during 1990-93  (see the bottom three rows in 
table 4.8). Especially  since the latter half of  the  1980s, the rate of  increase 
has accelerated. 
Second, this acceleration in FDI increase was mainly because  of  FDI to 
China and the ASEAN4 excluding the Philippines. FDI to the ANIEs grew 
rapidly, but without much acceleration. (FDI to China and the ASEAN4 in- 
creased by 3.1 and 2.7 times, respectively, during 1986-90 and by 3.1 and 1.9 
times during 1990-93,  as against a 1.4 times increase in FDI to the ASEAN4 Table 4.8  FDI Stocks: Pacific Asia (% share of total stock in each host country) 
Destination 




























46.7  32.3 
41.2  36.7 
30.6  37.4 
28.1  39.2 
14.2  36.7 
10.9  30.0 
10.9  27.2 
12.4  25.7 
30.1  16.8 
20.5  24.0 
31.5  28.2 
















































































































































































































3.6 Table 4.8  (continued) 
Destination 
Source  Hong Kong  Singapore  Taiwan  Korea  NlEs  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  ASEAN4  China  Total 
Tuiwan 
1982  I .3 
I986  0.0 
1990  n.a. 
1993  n.a. 
NIEs 
1982  3.0 
1986  1.4 
I990  I .7 
1993  2.6 
I982  0.0 
1986  0.0 
I990  0.9 
1993  I .8 
ASEAN4 
Tortrl (million $) 
I982  1,245 
I986  2,506 
1990  3,97  I 
I993  5,287 
Knrio of 
yeur-end stocks 
86/82  2.01 
90/86  1.58 




















n.a.  0.  I 
n.a.  0.0 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
8.3  0.0  3. I 
5.8  3.7  2.8 
5.6  3.6  3.0 
8.9  3.0  4.0 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0  0.  I 
0.0  0.0  0.2 
3,495  1,436  10,668 
5,893  3,633  18,453 
13,215  7,873  36,606 
17,667  10,552  50,  I I3 
1.69  2.53  1.73 
2.24  2.17  1.98 




















I .4  ma. 
I .8  n.a. 
2.3  n.a. 
3.5  I .9 
11.6  5.9 
15.4  6.0 
36.7  6.8 
31.3  9.3 
8.0  0.0 
4.4  0.0 
4.0  0.0 
4.4  0.0 
1,600  2,228 
3,2 17  2,722 
15,610  3,303 
3 1,233  4,897 
2.0 I  I  .22 
4.85  1.21 




















2.2  n.a.  I .5 
2.5  n.a.  1.4 
2.9  n.a.  I .7 
3.0  n.a.  I .8 
11.0  n.a.  8.4 
14.0  54.0  15.0 
23.1  60.7  23.3 
25.9  65.0  31.1 
2.5  n.a.  I .I 
1.1  0.5  0.7 
I .o  0.4  0.7 
0.9  0.9  0.8 
22,424  n.a.  33,092 
30,824  6,538  55,815 
83,278  20,452  140,336 
158,493  64,180  272,786 
1.37  n.a.  1.69 
2.70  3.13  2.5 I 
I .90  3.14  I  .94 
Source: Calculated from national statistics 131  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
during  1982-86.) Recall that FDI from the ANIEs is likely to be underesti- 
mated. 
Third, with increasing FDI in the region, Japan’s share as an investor was 
larger than the U.S. and EC shares and stayed almost constant throughout the 
1980s (26-28  percent), unlike the declining shares of the United  States and 
European  Community. Japan’s  share rose slightly  in  1986-90  but fell to 21 
percent in 1990-93,  mainly because of its cyclical downturn. 
Fourth,  the  share of  the ANIEs  as investors  has  dramatically  expanded 
throughout  the  entire period  covered, from 8 percent  (1982) to 31 percent 
(1993), the most remarkable new development in the region  since the early 
1980s. This  is particularly  the  case for the ASEAN4  in  the  late  1980s as 
well as in China since then. Two movements are notable: one is Hong Kong’s 
investment  in  China,  and  the  other  is,  to  a  lesser  degree,  Taiwan’s  in  the 
ASEAN4.8 
Fifth, FDI in the region grew rapidly and accelerated, and during the pro- 
cess, the share of intraregional FDI (from Japan plus the NIEs) increased from 
less than 40 percent (1982) to more than 50 percent (1990).  A notable point is 
that the increased intraregional direct investment proceeded hand in hand with 
increased intraregional trade. 
The developments in FDI in Pacific Asia, outlined above, undoubtedly have 
some structural factors in  common  with  FDI in the global context, though 
somewhat magnified. First, there is a general trend of expansion in worldwide 
production,  sourcing,  and  marketing  strategies by  international  businesses. 
This  “globalization”  trend  of  international  business  has  been  shared  and 
strengthened by those in rapidly growing developing economies in the region. 
We can confirm this by noting the accelerating intraregional trade and prolifer- 
ating horizontal and/or vertical international division of  labor found in manu- 
facturing industries. Second, other domestic factors must have contributed- 
for example, local economic growth and deregulation of capital movements 
in the region, both of which have been, again, particularly salient in Pacific 
Asia. 
4.4.3  International Banking Flows 
Finally, we will deal with banking flows, that is, the cross-border claims and 
liabilities of banks, a component of private capital flows whose geographical 
distribution is most difficult to trace. We note that, outside the BIS reporting 
area, Asia was the only region during 1985-93  in which cross-border lending 
by BIS-reporting banks continued to grow (see table 4.9). The distribution of 
8. Hong Kong’s FDI to China includes Chinese domestic investment via Hong Kong in pursuit 
of  the preferential treatment of  FDI in China, called “round-tripping” of Chinese capital. Thus, 
note that Hong Kong’s FDI to China is to some extent inflated by this round-tripping. See World 
Bank (1993~). 132  Akira Kohsaka 
Table 4.9  Distribution of International Bank Lending outside the Reporting 
Area by BIS-Reporting Banks (end of year) 
Positions (billion U.S. $)  Share (%) 
Country  1985  1990  1992  1993"  1985  1990  1992  1993a 
All countries  583.6  664.8  689.7  687.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Developed countries  112.3  161.2  149.1  142.7  19.2  24.2  21.6  20.8 
Latin America  236.5  184.8  187.4  189.8  40.5  27.8  27.2  27.6 
Asia  94.3  135.4  167.7  183.5  16.2  20.4  24.3  26.7 
Source: The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, Sec- 
ond Half1993 (Basel: BIS, 1993). 
"Preliminary figures for 1993. 













































































Source: The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution  of International Bank Lending, Sec- 
ond Half1993 (Basel: BIS, 1993). 
bank lending by the nationality of the reporting banks indicates the dominance 
of Japanese banks in Pacific Asia, particularly in its offshore financial centers, 
Hong Kong and Singapore (table 4.  In the case of Japanese banks, despite 
Japanese boom and bust, their long-term foreign-currency external lending in- 
creased solely in Asia during 1990-93  (Ministry of  Finance 1994). 
9. Similar geographical concentration could he found in the case of U.S. banks lending to Latin 
America and German hanks to Eastern Europe, hut their degrees of dominance are not  as great 
as Japan's. 133  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
One could correctly point out that it is impossible and useless to try too hard 
to trace multilateral banking flows. In fact, the existence of growing offshore 
financial  markets  makes  simply infeasible  the  construction  of  a  matrixlike 
table for bank loans within the region. Also, international financial transactions 
can no longer be regional because of developments in telecommunications and 
other technical innovations. 
When we look at the cross-border claims and liabilities of banks and non- 
banks, we recognize how widely and how deeply each economy is linked to 
the international financial market. The claims and liabilities of the two interna- 
tional financial centers, Hong Kong and Singapore, grew remarkably  during 
the  1980s, and those of Japan started to expand vigorously  in  1985. In fact, 
Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore increased cross-border claims and liabilities 
as a ratio to GDP two to four times during the  198Os.'O  Note that growth has 
been mainly in interbank transactions." 
Table 4.11 illustrates the key role of  Hong Kong in international financial 
transactions by reporting external bank claims and liabilities. The most con- 
spicuous fact is, of course, that the position of Japanese banks  as financial 
intermediaries  has  become paramount.  Table 4.11 also indicates that,  aside 
from the financial giant, Japan, a financial network through interbank transac- 
tions has steadily widened and deepened  in Pacific Asia by such players as 
China, Taiwan, and Singapore vis-a-vis Hong Kong. 
Financial interrelation has been promoted vigorously through three financial 
centers in the region, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Their market sizes 
as ratios to GDP increased by two to four times during the 1980s. Unlike the 
cases of official flows and FDI, Japan's role in banking flows has become huge 
since the  1980s. In fact, in the Hong Kong market, intraregional claims and 
liabilities amounted to 80 percent of the total. Although the other two ANIEs, 
Taiwan and Korea, are still cautious in opening up, their liberalizations of capi- 
tal transactions are now on the time table. Closer interdependence through cap- 
ital has been also found in cross-border banking. 
10. Cross-border claims by banks are (as a percentage of GDP) 
Country  1981  1990 
Japan  7  32 
Hong Kong  161  662 
Singapore  549  1,058 
Source: IMF (various years [b]), 
11, Malaysia and then Thailand became more closely linked with the international arena in the 
latter half of  the 1980s in terms of cross-border claims and liabilities. Although the liberalization 
of  their capital accounts will change the situations in Taiwan and Korea, this has not happened 
yet. A relatively thin link to the international market is also found in Indonesia and the Philippines. 134  Akira Kohsaka 
Table 4.11  External Bank Liabilities and Claims: Hong Kong 
Amount (million U.S. $)  Share (%) 



















































6,593  12,792 
10,731  258,273 
2,821  14,939 
1,364  1,039 
1,215  951 
20,162  29,881 
906  660 
139  185 
155  402 
646  870 
24,368  55,666 
83,399  402,952 
6,655  14,558 
13,320  309,419 
3,919  15,486 
8,286  6,642 
1,268  3,591 
14,462  28,192 
1,725  2,832 
938  830 
1,583  3,510 
2,934  1,551 
24,628  36,836 

























6.6  7.9  3.2  2.1 
5.5  12.9  64.1  65.4 
0.6  3.4  3.1  4.6 
1.3  1.6  0.3  0.3 
0.3  1.5  0.2  0.2 
25.2  24.2  7.4  8.0 
1.6  1.1  0.2  0.3 
0.5  0.2  0.0  0.1 
0.4  0.2  0.1  0.3 
2.1  0.8  0.2  0.2 
36.8  29.2  13.8  13.6 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
5.9  6.6  3.1  3.0 
5.7  13.2  66.7  64.5 
4.3  3.9  3.3  4.9 
7.9  8.2  1.4  1.7 
3.7  1.3  0.8  1.5 
10.2  14.3  6.1  4.4 
3.9  1.7  0.6  0.8 
1.3  0.9  0.2  0.3 
2.3  1.6  0.8  1.7 
7.0  2.9  0.3  0.1 
18.6  24.3  7.9  7.4 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source; Monrhly Digest of Staristics (Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority, various issues). 
4.5  The Role of Japan in the Region 
Finally, we examine the role of Japan as a major capital supplier as well as 
a financial intermediary in Pacific Asia. Japan’s total long-term capital outflow 
reached its peak of $192 billion in 1989, which coincided with the peak of its 
“bubble economy,” or financially inflated boom. After the bubble burst, along 
with the economic downturn, its capital outflow declined sharply and hit the 
bottom  at $58 billion in  1992. Among  the components of  capital, portfolio 
investment, the most significant since the mid-I980s, makes up more than 50 
percent of the total outflow, FDI 20 percent, and loans 10 percent. After 1992, 
FDI and loans shrank more than portfolio investment (see table 4.12). 
Although data on bilateral capital flows between Japan and Pacific Asia are Table 4.12  Long-Term Capital Account by Region: Japan (annual averages) 
A. World 
Amount (million U.S.  $)  Share (%) 


























-  3,434 
-  3,448 
13 
-  10,321 
-  10,258 
-  63 






-  132,974 







-  20 
-  13,639 




4,92  1 
-6,47  1 
-6,641 
170 
-31,925  -62,884 
-144,177  -80,517 
112,852  17,633 
-40,271  -  15,002 
-40,960  -  16,216 
689  1,213 
195  4,867 
202  4,873 
-7  -7 
12,425  -4,311 
-  19,258  -7,845 
31,683  3,535 
2,639  -45,932 
-75,722  -56,546 
78,360  10,614 
-6,913  -2,505 
-9,039  -4,783 



















100.0  100.0 
100.0  100.0 
100.0  100.0 
16.9  126.1 
16.4  28.3 
5.7  0.6 
2.3  -0.6 
2.2  -0.1 
-0.4  0.0 
10.3  -38.9 
9.8  13.3 
-1.5  28.1 
65.7  -8.3 
66.7  52.3 
92.9  69.4 
4.9  21.7 
4.8  6.2 





















Amount (million U.S. $)  Share (%) 










































-  1,774 
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Table 4.12  (continued) 
C. Other Asia 
Amount (million U.S. $)  Share (96) 
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-  80 
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-  1,982 




































































Source; Bank of Japan (various issues). 
‘Securities investment is identical to portfolio investment 
not available, table 4.12 shows long-term capital flows between Japan and two 
subregions in Asia, namely, the ANIEs and “other Asia,” the latter dominated 
by the ASEAN4 and China with respect to capital flows.’?  According to table 
4.12, parallel with  the general trend of flows, Japan’s capital outflow to the 
ANIEs fell sharply after 1990, while its outflow to “other Asia” remained rela- 
tively steady and significant. 
For the ANIEs, the main declining components were loans and trade credits, 
and then direct investment. In fact, in 1992-93  loans flew back into Japan from 
Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore partly because of a “stock adjustment” after 
the Japanese bubble burst.” The focus of Japanese FDI shifted away from the 
ANIEs after 1990 because these countries have lost their major advantages of 
cheap labor costs and undervalued exchange rates. On the other hand,  loan 
inflow from the ANIEs to Japan was significant throughout 1988-93, in partic- 
12. “Other Asia” includes, in addition to Pacific Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, 
East Timor, India, Macao, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
13. Long-term loans by  Japanese banks and insurance companies to Asian countries, particu- 
larly to Hong Kong, Korea. Singapore, and Thailand, once again expanded, reaching $13 billion 
in  1994 (Bank of  Japan, various issues). 137  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
ular during  1990-91  mainly vis-8-vis Hong Kong and Singapore. Note also 
that  there  was  significant ANIE  portfolio  investment  in  Japan  in  1990-91, 
again mainly through Hong Kong and Singapore. 
For “other Asia,” the recent retrenchment in Japan’s capital flows, described 
above, has hardly been felt (table 4.12). In fact, total net capital outflow de- 
clined, but only slightly from $6.3 billion (1988-89)  to $5.8 billion (1992-93). 
As for the composition of capital, loans and direct investment have remained 
the largest and second largest components (60 and 35 percent shares, respec- 
tively). Meanwhile, long-term capital inflow from “other Asia” to Japan has 
been negligible. 
This is not the whole story about capital flows between  Japan  and Asia, 
however, because we have not yet examined short-term capital flows and these 
flows are crucially important in discussing Japan’s role in capital flows in Pa- 
cific Asia. Because of data unavailability on multilateral flows from short-term 
monetary transactions, however, we cannot deal directly with their intraregional 
flows. Instead, we can only make some conjectures based on investment income 
data. Figure 4.2 shows Japan’s investment income flows by region since 1983. 
Investment income includes not only direct investment income but loan interest 
and other income accrued to Japan’s total external assets and liabilitie~.’~ 
Figure  4.2  shows  that  investment  income  flows  between  Japan  and  the 
ANIEs have been huge compared with those between Japan and the United 
States and the European Community. Note in particular that Japan paid more 
investment  income to the ANIEs than to the United States during  1988-92. 
This may seem puzzling because the United States has invested longer and 
more in Japan than have the ANIEs and capital flows between Japan and the 
ANIEs have declined significantly recently. The answer is given by figure 4.3, 
which illustrates Japan’s total external assets and liabilities outstanding by capi- 
tal flow component. 
Figure 4.3 shows that Japan’s  external assets consist mainly of  securities 
investment and short-term monetary  assets, plus  some direct investment and 
loans, and that its external liabilities are constituted primarily by short-term 
monetary liabilities and then by  securities investment. Thus, we see the sig- 
nificance of short-term monetary transactions,  which appeared, not in long- 
term capital flows, but in investment income by region. 
In other words, the hidden factor in the puzzle is short-term monetary flows 
between Japan and the ANIEs, in particular  Hong Kong and Singapore. Al- 
though international bank loans relatively  declined on a net basis in Pacific 
Asia, as elsewhere, international interbank claims and liabilities expanded on 
a gross basis rather  rapidly  through  international financial  centers, and this 
general trend enhanced and deepened international banking  flows within the 
region. Japan’s role in intraregional capital flows appears to reside in its key 
relationship with Hong Kong and Singapore. 
14. Investment income comprises direct investment income, interest on trade credit, loans, bank 
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4.6  Concluding Remarks 
We have examined developments in capital flows in Pacific Asia since the 
early  1980s. The regional pattern of external finance has been different from 
those of  other developing regions. First, Pacific Asia did not suffer from such 
a severe decline in foreign capital inflow in the 1980s as did other developing 
regions. Second, some countries in Pacific Asia became “source countries” of 
capital either overall or of a specific component of capital. 
However, Pacific Asia also displays some features in its changing pattern of 
external finance in common with other developing countries. FDI has begun to 
play a more significant role in capital flows. Portfolio investment has shown 
steady  growth  as  an  important  new  form of  capital  flows, though  its  sus- 
tainability remains in question.lS 
15. On the recent upsurge in portfolio investment flows to developing countries and its macro- 
economic impact, see Claessens (1995a, 1995b),  IMF (1994), World Bank (1993c), Calvo, Leider- 
man, and Reinhart (1993), Frankel (1994), Corbo and Hernandez (1994), Schadler et al. (1993), 
and Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993). 139  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
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The ANIEs have appeared as far more important  capital  suppliers  in the 
region since the  1980s. This has generated a greatly diversified and sophisti- 
cated network of  capital flows in Pacific Asia. This is obviously one of the 
reasons for the relative  decline of EC and U.S. capital in the region during 
that period. 
One of  the fundamental factors in this change in capital flows was the struc- 
tural development in macroeconomic balances of these economies in the pro- 
cess of their dynamic growth in the 1980s. Indeed, some of them “graduated” 
from the stage of  persistent domestic saving shortages typical of developing 
countries; this “graduation” in turn caused a significant change in the size and 
direction of capital flows. 
Even though long-term international bank loans have appeared to shrink on 
a net basis, cross-border bank claims and liabilities have shown a great increase 
relative to  domestic economic activities, especially through the international 140  Akira Kohsaka 
financial centers. This has widened and deepened international capital transac- 
tions among economies in the region.Ih 
As a result, Japan’s role as a capital supplier has remained large, although 
not larger than in the early  1980s. Its role has become limited to a specific 
category of lower-income countries in the region. In fact, Japan’s role in capital 
flows in Pacific Asia has been changing across various components of capital 
flows. It is no longer the dominant capital supplier in the region, though it has 
become the most important financial intermediary. 
After realizing the importance of structural changes in macroeconomic bal- 
ances and enhanced regional interdependence through capital flows, we should 
be more cautious in using regional aggregation. In such a dynamic region as 
Pacific  Asia,  aggregation  across  diverse  economies  sometimes  gives  mis- 
leading information  about amounts as well as directions  of  those flows that 
may cancel one another within the region. This may not only be the case for 
capital flows. 
Finally, we should note that, in the background  of these  shared develop- 
ments,  various  preconditions  for foreign  investment  were provided  by  host 
countries in Pacific Asia. They created the conditions necessary for increasing 
capital flows in order to help finance macroeconomic imbalances on one hand 
and tap technological spillovers on the other, while changes in the international 
economic climate as well as in the source countries may have created suffi- 
cient conditions. 
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COllKMXlt  Toshihiko Kinoshita 
Kohsaka’s paper gives an updated and well-balanced overview of capital flows 
both into and out of Pacific Asia and will no doubt benefit those who are inter- 
ested in this subject. Its coverage of all types of capital flows in this area is 
quite informative. Features of capital flow in Pacific Asia are made quite under- 
standable through  the comparison with Latin America.  In that sense, it is a 
good paper. However, it seems to me that the description dwells too much on 
the phenomenon-though  the analysis of savings-investment gaps as related 
to capital flow is well written. 
Broadly speaking, capital flows can be classified in two categories. One is 
determined by  the  market.  The other-official  development  finance  (ODA 
plus OOF except export credit)-is  determined by the policies of donor gov- 
ernments. The rise and fall of private capital flows, or the first category of flow, 
may well be explained by factors influencing the market. Kohsaka stresses in 
his  paper the  significance of  vigorously  growing  foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in this region. Then, the logic of the recent rise and fall of FDI from 
Japan and elsewhere must be further explained. Such explanation is necessary 
in order to have a better idea of what might happen in the future. 
There must be factors both in host countries and on the investors’ side that 
influence the rise and fall of FDI. On the host country side in this region, we 
can easily find such factors: deregulation policies, such as the open door and 
reform policies of China and Vietnam; a growing domestic (or regional) mar- 
ket; and competition among host countries to induce more FDI, in particular, 
export-oriented FDI. On the investors’ side, let me illustrate my interpretation 
Toshihiko Kinoshita is executive director and head of research at the Institute for International 
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of  the mechanism  that expanded Japan’s FDI in the  1980s and the reverse 
mechanism that decreased it in the early  1990s (see figs. 4C.1 to 4C.4). The 
increase in FDI by Taiwan and Korea could be explained by the appreciation 
of their currencies vis-i-vis the U.S. dollar, a domestic labor shortage, and a 
fast-growing technological backlog. 
Now, let me return to officially supported capital flow. As Kohsaka contends, 
it comprises ODA and OOF. Japan’s ODA, for instance, has shown fast growth. 
That of the United States has not in the past decade. This difference reflects 
the differing policies of the two countries. It may be worth mentioning. 
As for OOF, there exist two basic flows-one  multilateral, the other bilat- 
eral. Let me add some facts. The former comprises the capital flows of  the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The ADB will be more 
sensitive to a country-to-country balance in the region and the World Bank to 
a region-to-region balance (e.g., Asia vs. Africa). Bilateral OOF flows consist 
of officially supported suppliers’ and buyers’ credit and untied loans, which is 
more prevalent in this region, or such loans as have been massively supplied 
by the Export-Import Bank of Japan. Export credit as a whole is relatively less 
policy-based. It can be regarded as rather passive finance, particularly when 
the recipient  is very  creditworthy. Should exporters of  country A fail in an 
international tender on a specific project, country A’s  export credit agency is 
not requested to provide financing. 
The above-mentioned officially supported untied loans are one of the finan- 
cial menus used in the new policy of the Japanese government, since 1987, to 
flow more Japanese capital to developing countries in a harmonious way. The 
main  borrowers  have  been  governments  or governmental  agencies,  which 
sometimes relend to local private banks. These are my comments. Now let me 
ask one question. 
Kohsaka classifies countries in the region into three groups. China is classi- 
fied as a country that outflows capital somewhat and inflows capital at the same 
time. Will China’s pattern of  two-way capital flow continue into the twenty- 
first century? 
Comment  Ya-Hwei Yang 
Kohsaka’s paper gives an overview of  the recent trend of  capital flows both 
into and out of the Pacific Asia. Kohsaka finds that some countries in the region 
have become source countries of capital. Foreign direct investment has come 
to play  a more significant role. Portfolio investment appears to have shown 
steady growth. The author mentions that the fundamental factors which have 
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Expansion mechanism of Japan's outward FDI in the latter half of 
generated this change in capital flow are structural developments. Some of the 
countries have graduated from the stage of persistent domestic savings short- 
age. In addition, the role of Japan as a capital supplier has remained important, 
but not so dominant as before. 
I have learned a great deal from this paper. It provides valuable information 
on the above-mentioned  issues.  I  would  like  to  add  some  complementary 
points here. Some of the issues need further study, if enough data are available. 
First, if this paper were able to give more explanation for each important phe- 145  Interdependence through Capital Flows 
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Fig. 4C.3  Change in expansion mechanism of Japan’s outward FDI since the 
early 1990s 
nomenon, it would  be more comprehensive.  For example, why have the net 
capital flows in the relationship between Japan and the NIEs changed? In addi- 
tion, if  the capital  movement between  any  two countries  were identified, it 
would be more informative. I understand that data availability is a problem that 
cannot be solved at present. 
Because I am from Taiwan, I will give a brief synopsis of the case of Taiwan 
in related issues. Taiwan is one of the NIEs, also one of  the four “tigers” in 
Asia. It has maintained  a high growth rate and stable price levels. In recent 
years, many Taiwanese businesses have moved to other countries, especially to 
mainland China and Southeast Asia. The reason for this phenomenon  is that 
traditional labor-intensive goods made in Taiwan are not as competitive as be- 
fore. Labor in Taiwan has become more expensive because labor shortage is a 
serious problem. Land prices are increasing greatly, as well. Therefore, these 
traditional  industries  must  invest  abroad  to  search  for  cheaper labor  and 
cheaper land, instead of staying in Taiwan. In the past five years, much Taiwan- 
ese capital has gone to mainland China. In the past three years, some Southeast 
Asian countries,  such as Vietnam,  seem to be more attractive to Taiwanese 
investments. In  each of  these  Southeast Asian  countries,  Taiwan is usually 
ranked among the top three investor countries. When Taiwanese firms move 
outward, their primary capital fund sources are their head offices in Taiwan. 
Capital outflows generally follow the direction of overseas investment. There- 
fore, there is a large amount of capital flowing out of Taiwan. However, the 
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all industries; (B)  manufacturing sector 
Source: Wagakurii Kigyo No Knigni Jigvo Kntsudo (Ministry of  International Trade and Industry). 
no. 22 (1993). 
much of this capital movement passes through the underground economy, in- 
stead of through official financial channels. In addition, the trade and capital 
flow patterns between Japan and Taiwan have not changed much so far. Al- 
though Taiwan has been an export-oriented  country, it still has the same big 
trade deficit with Japan that it has had for decades. Most machines and key 
parts of manufactured  goods are imported from Japan to Taiwan. Therefore, 
the capital flow relationship between the two has not changed much. 
Different countries have different stories, and I have provided Taiwan’s case 
as a reference for Kohsaka’s paper. 